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Abstract
Meier (2012) gave a ”mathematical logic foundation” of the purely
measurable universal type space (Heifetz and Samet, 1998). The
mathematical logic foundation, however, discloses an inconsistency
in the type space literature: a finitary language is used for the belief
hierarchies and an infinitary language is used for the beliefs.
In this paper we propose an epistemic model to fix the inconsis-
tency above. We show that in this new model the universal knowledge-
belief space exists, is complete and encompasses all belief hierarchies.
Moreover, by examples we demonstrate that in this model the
players can agree to disagree – Aumann (1976)’s result does not hold –,
and Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)’s conditions are not sufficient
for Nash equilibrium. However, we show that if we substitute self-
evidence (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) for common knowledge, then
we get at that both Aumann (1976)’s and Aumann and Brandenburger
(1995)’s results hold.
Keywords: Incomplete information game, Agreeing to disagree,
Nash equilibrium, Epistemic game theory, Knowledge-belief space, Be-
lief hierarchy, Common knowledge, Self-evidence, Nash equilibrium
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1 Introduction
Looking at the ratings by the three big credit rating companies (Moody’s,
Standard & Poor’s, Fitch Ratings) we can see strange things. On the eve of
∗Financial support by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA) and the Ja´nos
Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
†Department of Mathematics, Corvinus University of Budapest and MTA-BCE
”Lendu¨let” Strategic Interactions Research Group, 1093 Hungary, Budapest, Fo˝va´m te´r
13-15., miklos.pinter@uni-corvinus.hu.
1
2012 Moody’s rated Poland at A2, Slovakia and Slovenia at A3, Standard
& Poor’s rated Poland at A-, Slovakia at A, and Slovenia at A+, while
Fitch Ratings rated Poland at A-, Slovakia at A+, and Slovenia at A. These
ratings contradict each other, since Moody’s put Poland higher than Slovakia,
while Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings put Slovakia higher than Poland,
furthermore, Standard & Poor’s put Slovenia higher than Slovakia, while
Fitch Ratings put Slovakia higher than Slovenia.
It seems theory says something else, Aumann (1976)’s seminal result
(roughly) says that if the the players’ opinions about something are com-
monly known under a common prior, then those are the same, so the players
cannot agree to disagree. However, we see something different in the example
above. We can suppose that the three major credit rating companies use the
same statistical and economic data, the same scientific and business methods
(common prior), they form opinion about the very same thing, their ratings
are public, so their ratings are commonly known. However the three big
credit rating companies agree to disagree. How can it happen?
In order to make the models of incomplete information situations more
amenable to analysis, Harsa´nyi (1967-68) proposed to replace the hierarchies
of beliefs by types. Later Mertens and Zamir (1985) introduced the notion
of type space, and quite recently Meier (2008) incorporated the knowledge
into type spaces, and introduced the concept of knowledge-belief space.
However, there is an inconsistency in the type space literature: while a
finitary language is used for the belief hierarchies (see Definition 2 in Meier
(2012)) an infinitary language is used for the beliefs (see Definition 3 in Meier
(2012)). Namely, the notions of σ-field and σ-additive measure assume the
players can reason about any countable sequence of events and of probabil-
ities. On the other hand, the belief hierarchies are only about any finite
reasoning level (I believe that you believe that I believe and so on). Can we
fix this inconsistency, if yes, what kind of model do we get at?
In this paper we fix the above mentioned inconsistency, and introduce
a family of classes of knowledge-belief spaces. Each member of the family
uses one specific language characterized by an infinite cardinal. E.g. in the
case of the smallest infinite cardinal a finitary language is applied, we mean
the information structures are fields, the beliefs are additive probability set
functions, and the belief hierarchies and common knowledge are as usual,
this case is partially covered by Meier (2006). In general, each class uses a
κ-language, where κ is an infinite cardinal number, we mean the information
structures are κ-fields, the beliefs are κ-additive probability measures, and
the belief hierarchies and common knowledge are defined as the levels can
be any ordinal number smaller than κ. Therefore we consider the problem
in full generality.
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Our proposed model of knowledge-belief spaces has remarkable prop-
erties. We show that the universal knowledge space exists (from Pinte´r
(2010) we know there is no universal topological type space, topological
type spaces are used in e.g. Bo¨ge and Eisele (1979), Mertens and Za-
mir (1985), Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), Heifetz (1993), Mertens et al
(1994), Pinte´r (2005) among others); the universal knowledge-belief space is
complete (Pinte´r (2014) demonstrated that Meier (2008)’s universal knowl-
edge-belief space is not complete); and the universal knowledge-belief space
encompasses all belief hierarchies (Heifetz and Samet (1999) showed that the
purely measurable universal type space (Heifetz and Samet, 1998), which is
complete (Meier, 2012), does not contain all belief hierarchies). To sum up,
our model outperforms the previous ones.
The proposed model, moreover, has some further peculiar properties. Nei-
ther Aumann (1976)’s nor Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)’s results do
not hold in our model. The reason why these seminal results are not valid
in our knowledge-belief spaces is that, in contrast with the epistemic models
in the literature where the notions of common knowledge and self-evidence
are equivalent (see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) Proposition 74.2, pp.
74-75), in our model self-evidence is a stronger notion than common knowl-
edge. This is because in our approach, in general, for a player and an event
A there is not maximal event among the events from the knowledge structure
of the player which is contained by A, that is, our knowledge operator is a
set valued mapping, it assigns a set of events to event A, while an ordinary
knowledge operator (Aumann, 1999a; Meier, 2008) assigns only one set, the
maximally contained set to event A.
A knowledge operator being a set valued mapping in our model is im-
portant for the completeness of the universal knowledge-belief space too. By
restricting the domain of the knowledge operators Meier (2008) was suc-
cessful in avoiding the traps around the problem of the existence of uni-
versal knowledge-belief space (see e.g. Brandenburger and Keisler (2006)).
However, Meier (2008)’s universal knowledge-belief space is not complete
(Pinte´r, 2014). Our notion of knowledge operator is more restricted than
Meier (2008)’s, but in our opinion, is still expressive enough, and not least,
makes possible that our universal knowledge-belief space is complete.
As we have already mentioned neither Aumann (1976)’s nor Aumann
and Brandenburger (1995)’s results are true in our model. We show, how-
ever, that if we substitute self-evidence for common knowledge, then both
results hold again. In other words, by distinguishing the notions of common
knowledge and self-evidence, it turns out that both Aumann (1976)’s and
Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)’s results depend rather on self-evidence
than on common knowledge.
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Back to the three big credit rating companies, even if the ratings of these
companies are common knowledge, those are not self-evident. Nobody knows
how exactly the credit rating companies calculate their rates, e.g. if Hun-
gary’s balance of payments goes up from 6.3 % of GDP (2013 Q3) to 6.5
% of GDP (that is, the surplus improves further), then will Moody’s up-
grade Hungary from Ba1 negative to Ba1 stable? Nobody knows, the ratings
are not self-evident. Therefore, our model does not contradict this real life
example. On the other hand, the intuitions behind Aumann (1976)’s and
Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)’s results are expressed in our model too,
if the rating methods were public, that is, the ratings were self-evident, then
those could not be different.
The setup of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss coun-
terexamples related to Aumann (1976)’s and Aumann and Brandenburger
(1995)’s results. Section 3 is about the notions of knowledge-beliefs space,
type morphism, universal knowledge-belief space and complete knowledge-
beliefs space. In Section 4 we discuss knowledge and belief hierarchies and
put our main result proved in Section 5. Section 6 revisits Aumann (1976)’s
and Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)’s results, and the last section briefly
concludes. An appendix about inverse systems and limits is enclosed.
2 Examples
In this section by examples we show two important consequences of applying
our proposed model.
2.1 Agreeing to disagree
Our first example is about that in the proposed model Aumann (1976)’s
result does not hold, that is, the players can agree to disagree.
Let Ω = [0, 1] be set of the states of the world, N = {1, 2} be the players
set. Moreover, let player 1’s knowledge structure be given by field A1 induced
by {[0, a) : a ∈ {1/2n : n ∈ N}}, similarly, let player 2’s knowledge structure
be given by field A2 induced by {[0, a] : a ∈ {1/2n : n ∈ N}}. Then A ∈ Ai
means for every event B such that A ⊆ B, player i knows event B at all
states of the world ω ∈ A.
Let P ′(w) =
{
1
2n+2
, if there exists n ∈ N : w = 1
2n
0 otherwise
, and l be the Le-
besgue measure, where both measures are defined on B([0, 1]), on the Borel
σ-field of [0, 1]. Then let the common prior P = l
2
+ P ′.
Furthermore, suppose that the players use a finitary language (this is
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already indicated by that we use fields). Then an event A ∈ A is commonly
known at state of the world w ∈ Ω, if there are sequences of events (Ain) ⊆ Ai,
i = 1, 2 such that Ain+1 ⊆ A1n∩A2n, for all n, Ai1 ⊆ A, and w ∈ ∩nAin, i = 1, 2.
In other words, at state of word w both players know event A (A11, A
2
1 ⊆ A),
and both players know that both players know event A (A12, A
2
2 ⊆ A11 ∩ A21),
and so on for any (finite) n.
Let A = {1/2n : n ∈ N \ {0}} and B = [0, 1). Then we get the following
claim:
Claim 1. For each w ∈ B, P1(A,w) = 13 and P2(A,w) = 12 , where Pi(A,w)
is player i’s belief about event A at state of the world w.
Proof. We consider two cases.
Case 1 There exists n∗ ∈ N such that w = 1
2n∗ : In this case player 1 is in
her part
[
1
2n∗ ,
1
2n∗−1
)
, and player 2 is in her part
(
1
2n∗+1 ,
1
2n∗
]
. Then
P1(A,w) =
P
(
A ∩
[
1
2n∗ ,
1
2n∗−1
))
P
([
1
2n∗ ,
1
2n∗−1
)) = P
({
1
2n∗
})
P
([
1
2n∗ ,
1
2n∗−1
))
=
1
2n∗+2
1
2n∗+2 +
1
2n∗+1
=
1
3
,
and
P2(A,w) =
P
(
A ∩
(
1
2n∗+1 ,
1
2n∗
])
P
((
1
2n∗+1 ,
1
2n∗
]) = P
({
1
2n∗
})
P
((
1
2n∗+1 ,
1
2n∗
])
=
1
2n∗+2
1
2n∗+2 +
1
2n∗+2
=
1
2
.
Case 2 There exists n∗ ∈ N such that w ∈
(
1
2n∗+1 ,
1
2n∗
)
: In this case player 1
is in her part
[
1
2n
∗+1 ,
1
2n
∗
)
, and player 2 is in her part
(
1
2n
∗+1 ,
1
2n
∗
]
. Then
P1(A,w) =
P
(
A ∩
[
1
2n∗+1 ,
1
2n∗
))
P
([
1
2n∗+1 ,
1
2n∗
)) = P
({
1
2n∗+1
})
P
([
1
2n∗+1 ,
1
2n∗
))
=
1
2n∗+3
1
2n∗+3 +
1
2n∗+2
=
1
3
,
5
and
P2(A,w) =
P
(
A ∩
(
1
2n∗+1 ,
1
2n∗
])
P
((
1
2n∗+1 ,
1
2n∗
]) = P
({
1
2n∗
})
P
((
1
2n∗+1 ,
1
2n∗
])
=
1
2n∗+2
1
2n∗+2 +
1
2n∗+2
=
1
2
.

Notice that at state of the world 1, P1(A, 1) = 1 and P2(A, 1) =
1
2
,
therefore the event of P1(A,w) =
1
3
and P2(A,w) =
1
2
is B. Then at state
of the world 0, B is commonly known, that is, it is common knowledge that
P1(A,w) =
1
3
6= 1
2
= P2(A,w), so Aumann (1976)’s theorem does not hold
here, the players agree to disagree.
It is also worth noticing that since P (B) = 1, in this example the players
P almost surely agree to disagree; and event B is not self-evident.
2.2 Epistemic condition for Nash equilibrium
Our second example is about that in the proposed model Aumann and Bran-
denburger (1995)’s result (THEOREM B, p. 1168) does not hold, that is,
the imposed conditions do not imply that the players play Nash equilibrium.
Let Ω = [0, 1] be the set of the states of the world, N = {1, 2, 3} be
the players set. Moreover, let the knowledge structures of players 1 and 2
be given as in the previous example (Section 2.1), and player 3’s knowledge
structure be given by B([0, 1]), by the Borel σ-field. Furthermore, let the
common prior P be also from the previous example (Section 2.1).
Consider the following game in strategic form:
T L R
U (2, 1, 1) (1, 0, ·)
D (1, ·, ·) (0, ·, ·)
B L R
U (1, 1, 0) (·, 3, ·)
D (2, ·, ·) (·, ·, ·)
that is, the actions sets are A1 = {U,D}, A2 = {L,R} and A3 = {T,B}
respectively, and the ·s denote not specified payoffs. Suppose that at each
state of the world w ∈ Ω the players play the above game.
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Let the players’ conjectures be as follows. Player 1: at each state of
the world she believes that player 2 plays action L and that player 3 plays
action T if w ∈ A, where A is from the previous example (Section 2.1).
In other words, player 1 believes player 3 plays action T with probability
P1(A,w) (see Section 2.1). Similarly, at each state of the world w ∈ Ω player
2 believes that player 1 plays action U and that player 3 plays action T with
probability P2(A,w) (see Section 2.1). Finally, at each state of the world
player 3 believes that player 1 plays action U and that player 2 plays action
L.
Moreover, suppose that at each state of the world player 1 plays action
D, player 2 plays action R and player 3 plays action T .
Then it is clear that for each state of the world w ∈ [0, 1) player 1’s
conjecture is
(
L, 1
3
T − 2
3
B
)
, player 2’s conjecture is
(
U, 1
2
T − 1
2
B
)
, and player
3’s conjecture is (U,L). Moreover, at each state of the world w ∈ [0, 1), each
player maximizes her own expected payoffs, that is, all players are rational.
Summing up, at state of the world 0, the event of the players’ conjec-
tures are
(
L, 1
3
T − 2
3
B
)
,
(
U, 1
2
T − 1
2
B
)
, (U,L) respectively, and all players
are rational, and the game above is played is commonly known, however, the
players play action profile (D,R, T ) which is not a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, it is worth noticing that in this example we impose stronger con-
dition than Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)’s, and stronger than Polak
(1999)’s, moreover, the event of the players’ conjectures are
(
L, 1
3
T − 2
3
B
)
,(
U, 1
2
T − 1
2
B
)
, (U,L) respectively, and all players are rational, and the game
above is played is not self-evident, but happens P almost surely.
3 The knowledge-belief space
Notation: Throughout the paper κ is an infinite cardinal. Let N be the set
of the players, w.l.o.g. we can assume that 0 /∈ N , and let N0 = N ∪ {0},
where 0 is for the nature as a player.
Let #A be the cardinality of set A, and P(A) is the power set of A.
A set system A ⊆ P(X) is a κ-field, if (Ai)i∈I ⊆ A such that #I < κ
implies
⋃
i∈I Ai ∈ A. Notice that if κ is the smallest infinite cardinal then
κ-field means field, if κ is the smallest uncountable infinite cardinal, then
κ-field means σ-field. Let A ⊆ P(X) be a set system, then κ(A) denotes
the coarsest κ-field that contains A. Furthermore, (X,A) is a κ-measurable
space if A is a κ-field on X.
Let (X,M) and (Y,N ) be κ-measurable spaces, then (X × Y,M⊗N )
or briefly X ⊗ Y is the κ-measurable space on the set X × Y equipped with
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the κ-field κ({A×B : A ∈M, B ∈ N}).
The κ-measurable spaces (X,M) and (Y,N ) are measurable isomorphic if
there is a bijection f between them such that both f and f−1 are measurable.
Let A be a field and µ be an additive set function on A. Then µ is
κ-additive, if for each generalized sequence (net) (Ai)i∈I from A, such that
#I < κ, i ≥ j implies Ai ⊆ Aj, and ⋂i∈I Ai = ∅: limi∈I µ(Ai) = 0. Notice
that if κ is the smallest infinite cardinal than κ-additivity means additivity,
if κ is the smallest uncountable infinite cardinal, then κ-additivity means
σ-additivity.
The triplet (X,A, µ) is a κ-measure space if (X,A) is a κ-measurable
space and µ is a κ-additive set function on A. If µ(X) = 1 then µ is a
probability κ-measure, and (X,A, µ) is a probability κ-measure space.
For an ordinal number ω we say ω < κ, if the cardinality of ω is less than
κ.
The fixed infinite cardinal κ refers to the language of the model, if κ is the
smallest infinite cardinal, then the language is finite, otherwise the language
is a κ-language, so less than κ-many operations (unions, etc.) can be applied.
In other words, somehow κ refers to the cognitive power of the players.
In the following, we use terminologies which are similar to Heifetz and
Samet (1998)’s and Meier (2008)’s.
Definition 2. Let (X,M) be a κ-measurable space and denote ∆(X,M)
the set of probability κ-measures on it. Then the κ-field A∗ on ∆(X,M) is
defined as follows:
A∗ = κ({{µ ∈ ∆(X,M) : µ(A) ≥ p}, A ∈M, p ∈ [0, 1]}) .
In other words, A∗ is the smallest κ-field among the κ-fields that contain the
sets {µ ∈ ∆(X,M) : µ(A) ≥ p}, where A ∈ M and p ∈ [0, 1] are arbitrarily
chosen.
In incomplete information situations it is recommended to consider events
like a player believes with probability at least p that a certain event occurs
(beliefs operator see e.g. Aumann (1999b)). For this reason, for any A ∈M
and p ∈ [0, 1], {µ ∈ ∆(X,M) : µ(A) ≥ p} must be an event (a measurable
set). To keep the class of events as small (coarse) as possible, we use κ-field
A∗.
Notice that A∗ is not a fixed κ-field, it depends on the measurable space
on which the probability κ-measures are defined. Therefore A∗ is similar
to the weak∗ topology, which depends on the topology of the base (primal)
space.
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Assumption 3. Let the parameter space (S,A) be a κ-measurable space.
Henceforth we assume that (S,A) is the fixed parameter space which
consists of the states of the nature.
Definition 4. Let Ω be the space of the states of the world, and for each
player i ∈ N0, let Mi be a κ-field on Ω. The κ-field Mi is player i’s knowl-
edge structure, that is, at each state of the world w ∈ A ∈ Mi, player i
knows event A. The κ-field M0 is the nature’s knowledge structure, that is,
this is the representation of A (the κ-field of the parameter space S). Let
M = κ(⋃i∈N0Mi), the smallest κ-field that contains all κ-fields Mi.
Each point in Ω provides a complete description of the actual state of
the world. It includes both the state of nature and the players’ states of the
mind. The different κ-fields are for modeling the informedness of the players,
these have the same role as e.g. the partitions in Aumann (1999a)’s paper
have. Therefore, if w,w′ ∈ Ω are not distinguishable 1 in the κ-field Mi,
then player i is not able to discern the difference between them, that is, she
knows, believes the same things and behaves in the same way at the two
states w and w′. M represents all information available in the model, it is
the κ-field got by pooling the information of the players and the nature.
For the sake of brevity, henceforth – if it does not make confusion – we do
not indicate the κ-fields. E.g. instead of (S,A) we write S, or ∆(S) instead
of (∆(S,A),A∗). However, in some cases we refer to the non-written κ-field:
e.g. A ∈ ∆(X,M) is a set from A∗, that is, this is a measurable set in
the κ-measurable space (∆(X,M),A∗); but A ⊆ ∆(X,M) keeps its original
meaning: A is a subset of ∆(X,M).
Before we introduce our notion of knowledge-belief space we discuss the
notion of knowledge operator in details. In Meier (2008) player i’s knowledge
operator is a mapping fromM toMi. The intuition is clear, for every event
fromM the knowledge operator gives the set of all states of the world where
player i knows the event. Formally, to event A ∈ M, player i’s knowledge
operator assigns set {w ∈ Ω: there exists A′ ∈ Mi, w ∈ A′ and A′ ⊆ A} =⋃
w∈A′⊆A, A′∈Mi A
′. Since in Meier (2008) the players’ knowledge structures
are σ-fields the range of the knowledge operators are Mis.
In our model, however, e.g. if we use a finite language, then the players
knowledge structures are only fields, so e.g. for player i, set
⋃
w∈A′⊆A, A′∈Mi A
′
is not necessarily inMi. In other words, in our model the set of states of the
world at which a player knows an event is not necessarily an event. Therefore,
1Let (X, T ) be a κ-measurable space and x, y ∈ X be two points. Points x and y are
measurably indistinguishable if for all A ∈ T : (x ∈ A)⇔ (y ∈ A).
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we must use a more general notion than ordinary mapping to capture the
intuition of the knowledge operator.
In this paper we use set valued mappings as knowledge operators, e.g.
for player i, events A ∈ M and A′ ∈ Mi, event A′ is in the image of event
A by the player’s knowledge operator, if A′ ⊆ A, that is, if at each state
of the world w ∈ A′, player i knows event A. Therefore, we must formalize
mutual knowledge and common knowledge differently from Aumann (1999a)
or Meier (2008); for the details see Sections 4 and 6.
Definition 5. Let {(Ω,Mi)}i∈N0 be the space of the states of the world.
Then the tuple (S, {(Ω,Mi)}i∈N0 , g, {ki}i∈N , {fi}i∈N) is a knowledge-belief
space based on the parameter space S, where
1. function g : Ω→ S is M0-measurable,
2. for each player i ∈ N : the set valued mapping ki : M → P(Mi) is
player i’s knowledge operator defined as: A ∈ M, ki(A) = {A′ ∈
Mi : A′ ⊆ A}.
3. for each player i ∈ N : fi : Ω→ ∆(Ω,M−i) is player i’s type function,
such that
a) fi is Mi-measurable,
b) for each w ∈ Ω, A ∈ M−i such that there exists A′ ∈ Mi, w ∈ A′
and A′ ⊆ A: fi(w)(A) = 1,
where M−i = κ(⋃j∈N0\{i}Mj).
In other words Definition 5 says that S is the parameter space, it consists
of the ”types” of the nature. Mi represents the information available for
player i, hence it corresponds to the concept of types (Harsa´nyi, 1967-68).
Set valued mapping ki is player i’s knowledge operator, and mapping fi is
the type function of player i, it assigns player i’s (subjective) beliefs to her
types.
It is worth elaborating on the knowledge operator a bit further. Our
definition says that for any player there are some events which are self-evident
for her, and these events – because of the language / cognitive power of the
player – form a κ-field. This κ-field is the player’s knowledge structure. Then
the knowledge operator at event A ∈ M (M is induced by the events self-
evident for a player or for the nature) is the set of the player’s self-evident
events implying event A. Furthermore, this means, that a player knows event
A is not (necessarily) an event; but we can express that a player knows that
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another player knows an event and the like in a different way, see Section
4. Furthermore, it is easy to see that for any player i and event A, ki(A) is
closed under κ-unions and κ-intersections.
In its spirit the above notion of knowledge-belief space is similar to Meier
(2008)’s notion, but differs from it in two main points: (1) we use κ-models
(κ-field, probability κ-measures), (2) our knowledge operators are set valued
mappings. On the other hand, even if our knowledge operator is not the same
as Aumann (1999a)’s or Meier (2008)’s, the intuitions behind all three notions
– in our opinion – are the same, which is demonstrated by the following
(obvious) lemma.
Lemma 6. Consider the knowledge-belief space (S, {(Ω,Mi)}i∈N0 , g, {ki}i∈N ,
{fi}i∈N). Then for each player i, the knowledge operator ki meets the follow-
ing points, for all events A,B ∈M and (Aj)j∈J ⊆Mi such that #J < κ:
1. A′ ∈ ki(A) implies A′ ⊆ A,
2.
⋂
j∈J ki(Aj) = ki
(⋂
j∈J Aj
)
,
3. (Monotonicity) A ⊆ B implies ki(A) ⊆ ki(B),
4. (Positive introspection) ki(A) ⊆ ⋃A′∈ki(A) ki(A′),
5. (Negative introspection) {ki(A) ⊆ ⋃A′∈{ki(A) ki(A′),
6. A ∈ ki(A) in case of A ∈Mi.
Next we define the notion of type morphism.
Definition 7. A mapping ϕ : Ω→ Ω′ is a type morphism between knowledge-
belief spaces (S, {(Ω,Mi)}i∈N0 , g, {ki}i∈I , {fi}i∈N) and (S, {(Ω′,M′i)}i∈N0 , g′,
{k′i}i∈N , {f ′i}i∈N) if
1. ϕ is an M-measurable mapping,
2. Diagram (1) is commutative, that is, for each state of the world w ∈ Ω:
g′ ◦ ϕ(w) = g(w),
Ω
Ω′
ϕ
? g′ - S
g
-
(1)
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3. for each player i ∈ N , Diagram (2) is commutative, that is, for every
event A ∈M′: ki ◦ ϕ−1(A) = ϕ−1 ◦ k′i(A),
M′ k
′
i- P(M′i)
M
ϕ−1
? ki- P(Mi)
ϕ−1
?
(2)
4. for each player i ∈ N , Diagram (3) is commutative, that is, for each
state of the world w ∈ Ω: f ′i ◦ ϕ(w) = ϕˆi ◦ fi(w),
Ω
fi - ∆(Ω,M−i)
Ω′
ϕ
? f ′i - ∆(Ω′,M′−i)
ϕˆi
?
(3)
where ϕˆi : ∆(Ω,M−i) → ∆(Ω′,M′−i) is defined as follows: for all
µ ∈ ∆(Ω,M−i), A ∈ M′−i: ϕˆi(µ)(A) = µ(ϕ−1(A)). It is an easy
calculation to show that ϕˆi is a measurable mapping.
A type morphism ϕ is a type isomorphism, if ϕ is a bijection and ϕ−1 is also
a type morphism.
A type morphism assigns type profiles from a knowledge-belief space to
type profiles in a(nother) knowledge-belief space in the way the corresponded
types induce equivalent knowledge and beliefs for all players. In other words,
the type morphism preserves the players’ knowledge and beliefs.
The following result is a direct corollary of Definitions 5 and 7.
Corollary 8. The knowledge-belief spaces based on the parameter space S as
objects and the type morphisms form a category. Let CS denote this category
of knowledge-belief spaces.
Next we introduce our notion of universal knowledge-belief space.
Definition 9. A knowledge-belief space (S, {(Ω,Mi)}i∈N0 , g, {ki}i∈N , {fi}i∈N
) is a universal knowledge-belief space, if for every knowledge-belief space (S,
{(Ω′,M′i)}i∈N0 , g′, {k′i}i∈N , {f ′i}i∈N) there exists a unique type morphism ϕ :
Ω′ → Ω.
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In other words, a universal knowledge-belief space is the most general,
the biggest knowledge-belief space among the knowledge-belief spaces. A
universal knowledge-belief contains all types of all knowledge-belief spaces of
the given category.
In the language of category theory Definition 9 means the following:
Corollary 10. A universal knowledge-belief space is a terminal (final) object
in category CS.
Since every terminal object is unique up to isomorphism, from the view-
point of category theory the uniqueness of universal knowledge-belief space
is a straightforward statement.
Corollary 11. The universal knowledge-belief space is unique up to type
isomorphism.
Next, we turn our attention to another property of knowledge-belief
spaces, to the completeness.
Definition 12. A knowledge-belief space (S, {(Ω,Mi)}i∈N0 , g, {ki}i∈N , {fi}
i∈N) is complete, if for each player i ∈ N , type function fi is surjective
(onto).
Brandenburger (2003) introduced the concept of complete type space,
and Pinte´r (2014) adapted the notion of completeness to knowledge-belief
spaces. The completeness recommends that for any player i, any probability
κ-measure on (Ω, M−i) be in the range of the player’s type function. In
other words, for any player i, any κ-measure on (Ω,M−i) must be assigned
(by the type function fi) to a type of player i.
4 Knowledge and belief hierarchies
In this section we consider the knowledge operator, by which the notion of
mutual knowledge is defined (Aumann, 1999a), and formalize the intuition
of hierarchies of beliefs, as Harsa´nyi (1967-68) named the ”infinite regress in
reciprocal expectations”.
First we consider the knowledge hierarchies. Take knowledge-belief space
(S, {(Ω,Mi)}i∈N0 , g, {ki}i∈N , {fi}i∈N), and state of the world w ∈ Ω. Then
player i knows event A at state of the world w, if there exists Ai ∈ ki(A)
such that w ∈ Ai. Furthermore, the players mutually know event A at state
of the world w, if there exist Ai ∈ ki(A), i ∈ N , such that w ∈ ⋂i∈N Ai. For
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the sake of clear exposition we introduce the following notation, let k1(A) =
{X ⊆ Ω: there exist Ai ∈ ki(A), i ∈ N, such that X = ⋂i∈N Ai}. Notice
that k1 is somehow similar to the notion of first order mutual knowledge
operator in Aumann (1999a).
Similarly, the players second order mutually know event A at state of the
world w, if there exist Ai ∈Mi, i ∈ N , X ∈ k1(A) such that Ai ⊆ X, i ∈ N ,
and w ∈ ⋂i∈N Ai. A further notation, let k2(A) = {X ⊆ Ω: there exist Ai ∈
Mi, i ∈ N, Y ∈ k1(A) such that Ai ⊆ Y, i ∈ N, X = ⋂i∈N Ai}.
In general, for any ordinal number ω such that ω < κ, the players ω+1th
order mutually know event A at state of the world w, if there exist Ai ∈
Mi, i ∈ N , X ∈ kω(A) such that Ai ⊆ X, i ∈ N , and w ∈ ⋂i∈N Ai.
The auxiliary notation, let kω+1(A) = {X ⊆ Ω: there exist Ai ∈ Mi, i ∈
N, Y ∈ kω(A) such that Ai ⊆ Y, i ∈ N, X = ⋂i∈N Ai}.
Notice that our notion of knowledge operator – which differs from the one
by Aumann (1999a), as we have already discussed in the previous section –
reflects the very same ideas as Aumann (1999a)’s notion does. Again, the
reason why we need more complex notions and notation in handling the
higher order knowledge issues is that the knowledge operator is a set valued
mapping in our model.
Next we consider the belief hierarchies. The following definition is a
reformulation of Mertens et al (1994)’s concept.
Definition 13. Let i ∈ N be a player, and consider Diagram (4)
Θi ∆(S ⊗ΘN\{i})
Θiω+1
piω+1
?
= ∆(S ⊗ΘN\{i}ω )
idS
?
pN\{i}ω
?
Θi1
qi1ω+1
?
= ∆(S ⊗ΘN\{i}0 )
idS
?
q
N\{i}
0ω
?
(4)
where
• ω is an ordinal number such that ω < κ,
• Θi0 is a singleton set, ΘN\{i}ω =
⊗
j∈N\{i}Θjω,
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• for each µ ∈ Θω+2:
qiω+1ω+2(µ) = µ|S⊗ΘN\{i}ω ,
therefore qiω+1ω+2 is a measurable mapping.
• Θi = lim←−(Θ
i
ω, Kκ, q
i
ωω+1), where Kκ = {ω′ is an ordinal number : ω′ <
κ},
• piω : Θi → Θiω is the canonical projection,
• qN\{i}ωω+1 is the product of the mappings qjωω+1, j ∈ N \ {i}, and so is
pN\{i}ω of p
j
ω, j ∈ N \ {i}, therefore both mappings are measurable,
• ΘN\{i} = ⊗j∈N\{i}Θj.
Then T = S ⊗ΘN is called purely measurable beliefs space.
The interpretation of the purely measurable beliefs space is the following.
For any θi ∈ Θi: θi = (µi1, µi2, . . .), where µiω ∈ Θiω is player i’s ωth order
belief. Therefore each point of Θi defines an inverse system of probability
κ-measure spaces
((S ⊗ΘN\{i}ω , piω+1(θi)), Kκ, (idS, qN\{i}ωω+1 )) , (5)
where (idS, q
N\{i}
ωω+1 ) is the product of mappings idS and q
N\{i}
ωω+1 . We call the
inverse systems of probability κ-measure spaces like (5) player i’s hierarchies
of beliefs.
To sum up, T consists of all states of the world: all states of nature: the
points of S, and all players’ all states of the mind: the points of set ΘN ,
therefore T contains all players’ all hierarchies of beliefs.
Our main result:
Theorem 14. The universal knowledge-belief space exists, is complete, and
encompasses all players’ all hierarchies of beliefs.
We present the proof of Theorem 14 in the next section.
5 The proof of Theorem 14
The strategy of the proof is to show that the purely measurable beliefs space
(see Definition 13) ”generates” the universal knowledge-belief space (in cate-
gory CS). It is worth mentioning that this proof for the existence of universal
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knowledge-belief space goes as Heifetz and Samet (1998)’s, Meier (2008)’s
proofs, the construction of canonical model in modal logic goes, that is, the
same machinery lays behind all these results. We do not go into the details
of the common behind these results, only mention that the theory of coalge-
bras and final coalgebras is the common umbrella for these and other results,
see Moss and Viglizzo (2004, 2006); Cirstea et al (2011); Moss (2011) among
others.
Mathematically, the key point of the proof is to demonstrate the following
lemma:
Lemma 15. For each player i ∈ N , type θi ∈ Θi, the inverse system of
probability κ-measure spaces
((S ⊗ΘN\{i}ω , piω+1(θi)), Kκ, (idS, qN\{i}ωω+1 )) (6)
admits a unique inverse limit.
Proof. (1) By the Axiom of Choice lim←−((S ×Θ
N\{i}
ω ), Kκ, (idS, q
N\{i}
ωω+1 )) 6= ∅.
(2)
⋃
ω∈Kκ(idS, p
N
ω )
−1(S ⊗ ΘNω ), that is, the union of the inverse images
of the κ-fields on S × ΘNω , ω ∈ Kκ is a κ-field: First, it is easy to see that
∅ ∈ ⋃ω∈Kκ(idS, pNω )−1(S ⊗ ΘNω ), and if A ∈ ⋃ω∈Kκ(idS, pNω )−1(S ⊗ ΘNω ), then
{A ∈ ⋃ω∈Kκ(idS, pNω )−1(S ⊗ΘNω ).
Let Ai ∈ ⋃ω∈Kκ(idS, pNω )−1(S ⊗ ΘNω ), i ∈ I, #I < κ. Then by def-
inition for each Ai there exist ω(i) ∈ Kκ and Bi ∈ S ⊗ ΘNω(i) such that
Ai = (idS, p
N
ω(i))
−1(Bi).
Then there exists ordinal number ω∗ ∈ Kκ such that ω(i) ≤ ω∗, i ∈ I
(see e.g. Folland (1999) Section 0.4). Since (S ⊗ ΘNω∗) is a κ-field and Ai =
((idS, q
N
ω(i)ω∗) ◦ (idS, pNω∗))−1(Bi), i ∈ I,
⋃
iAi ∈
⋃
ω∈Kκ(idS, p
N
ω )
−1(S ⊗ΘNω ).
(3) µ defined by µ ◦ p−1ω = piω(θi) is κ-additive. It is clear that µ is well-
defined and additive, then we can take any monotone decreasing κ-sequence
of events with empty limit and apply the reasoning of point (2) to get µ is
κ-additive. 
Next we show that the beliefs space of Definition 13 induces a knowledge-
belief space.
Lemma 16. The purely measurable beliefs space T induces a knowledge-belief
space in category CS.
Proof. For each player i ∈ N , let pri : T → Θi, pr0 : T → S be the coordinate
projections, and for each player i ∈ N ∪ {0}, let the κ-field M∗i be induced
by pri. From Lemma 15 for each player i ∈ N :
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Θi = ∆(S ⊗ΘN\{i}) , (7)
by that we mean, the left hand side and the right hand side are measurable
isomorphic.
Furthermore, let g∗ = pr0 and for each player i ∈ N , let f ∗i = pri.
Moreover, for each player i ∈ N and event A ∈ M∗, let k∗i (A) = {A′ ∈
M∗i : A′ ⊆ A}. Then
(S, {(T,M∗i )}i∈N , g∗, {ki}i∈N , {f ∗i }i∈N)
is a knowledge-belief space in category CS. 
The following proposition is a direct corollary of Equation (7).
Proposition 17. The knowledge-belief space (S, {(T,M∗i )}i∈N , g∗, {k∗i }i∈N ,
{f ∗i }i∈N) is complete.
Next we show that the knowledge-belief space induced by the purely
measurable beliefs space is the universal knowledge-belief space.
Proposition 18. The knowledge-belief space (S, {(T,M∗i )}i∈N , g∗, {k∗i }i∈N ,
{f ∗i }i∈N) is a universal knowledge-belief space in category CS.
Proof. Let (S, {(Ω,Mi)}i∈N , g, {ki}i∈N , {fi}i∈N) be a knowledge-belief space,
and take player i ∈ N and state of the world w ∈ Ω.
Player i’s first order belief at state of the world w, vi1(w) is the probability
κ-measure defined as follows, for each A ∈ S:
vi1(w)(A) = fi(w)(g
−1(A)) .
fi is Mi-measurable, hence vi1 is also Mi-measurable.
Player i’s second order belief at state of the world w, vi2(w) is the proba-
bility κ-measure defined as follows, for each A ∈ S ⊗ΘN\{i}1 :
vi2(w)(A) = fi(w)((g, v
N\{i}
1 )
−1(A)) ,
where for each w′: (g, vN\{i}1 )(w
′) = (g(w′), {vj1(w′)}j∈N\{i}), hence (g, vN\{i}1 )
is M−i-measurable. Since fi is Mi-measurable vi2 is also Mi-measurable.
For any ordinal number ω ∈ Kκ player i’s ω + 1th order belief at state
of the world w, viω+1(w) is the probability κ-measure defined as follows, for
each A ∈ S ⊗ΘN\{i}ω :
viω+1(w)(A) = fi(w)((g, v
N\{i}
ω )
−1(A)) .
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Since fi is Mi-measurable viω+1 is also Mi-measurable.
Then, we have got the mapping φ : Ω → T defined as follows, for each
w ∈ Ω:
φ(w) = (g(ω), (vi1(w), v
i
2(w), . . .)i∈N) . (8)
Then it is easy to verify the following:
(1) φ is M-measurable,
(2) for each i ∈ N , w ∈ Ω:
g∗ ◦ φ(w) = g(w) ,
and for each event A ∈M∗ and player i ∈ N :
ki ◦ φ−1(A) = φ−1 ◦ k∗i (A) ,
and
f ∗i ◦ φ(w) = φˆi ◦ fi(w) ,
that is, φ is a type morphism,
(3) Since Θi consists of different inverse systems of probability κ-measure
spaces (hierarchies of beliefs), φ is the unique type morphism from the
knowledge-belief space (S, {(Ω,Mi)}i∈N , g, {ki}i∈N , {fi}i∈N) to the knowl-
edge-belief space (S, {(T,M∗i )}i∈N , g∗, {k∗i }i∈N , {f ∗i }i∈N). 
In the above proof we show that each point in a knowledge-belief space in-
duces a hierarchy of beliefs for each player, that is, each point in a knowledge-
belief space completely describes the players’ hierarchies of beliefs at the
states of the world.
It is also worth noticing that in the above proof φ is not necessarily
injective (one-to-one). The φ-image of redundant types, that is, types that
generate the same knowledge and hierarchy of beliefs, see e.g. Ely and Peski
(2006), is one point in the universal knowledge-belief space. Therefore, there
are no redundant types in the universal knowledge-belief space.
The proof of Theorem 14. From Corollary 11 and Proposition 18
(S, {(T,M∗i )}i∈N , g∗, {k∗i }i∈N , {f ∗i }i∈N) (9)
is the universal knowledge-belief space.
From Proposition 17: (9) is complete.
Finally, from Definition 13: (9) encompasses all players’ all hierarchies of
beliefs. 
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6 Aumann (1976) and Aumann and Bran-
denburger (1995) are revisited
In Section 2 we demonstrated by two examples that in our model Aumann
(1976)’s and Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)’s results do not hold. As we
pointed out in the introduction, the reason for this is that in our model that
an event is common knowledge is not necessarily an event, so it can happen
– and in the two examples in Section 2 this happens indeed – a player does
not know that an event is common knowledge. In other words, the common
knowledge might be out of the class of events the player can perceive.
In this section we introduce formally the notions of common knowledge
and self-evidence into our model. Thereafter, we show that if we substitute
self-evidence for common knowledge in Aumann (1976)’s (and Polak (1999)’s)
and Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)’s papers, then these results hold in
our model too.
First we introduce the notion of common knowledge.
Definition 19. Consider knowledge-belief space (S, {(T,Mi)}i∈N , g, {ki}i∈N ,
{fi}i∈N). Then event A ∈M is commonly known at state of the world w ∈ Ω,
if for all ordinal numbers ω such that ω < κ, there exist Ai ∈ Mi, i ∈ N ,
X ∈ kω(A), such that Ai ⊆ X, i ∈ N , and w ∈ ⋂i∈N Ai. In other words,
event A is commonly known at state of the world w, if event A is ωth order
mutually known at state of the world w, for all ω < κ.
The above definition of common knowledge reflects the very same intu-
ition that Aumann (1999a)’s does, that is, an event is commonly known at
a state of the world, if it is mutually known on any order the model allows,
at the state of the world. In other words, an event is commonly known, if
every player knows the event, every player knows that every player knows
the event, and so on for all level less than κ.
In Aumann (1999a)’s model the above definition of common knowledge is
equivalent with the following: an event is commonly known, if it is a fixpoint
of each player’s knowledge operator (in sense of Aumann (1999a)), see e.g.
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) Proposition 74.2, pp. 74-75. Here, however,
this definition is not equivalent with the one above, see the examples in
Section 2.
Definition 20. Consider knowledge-belief space (S, {(T,Mi)}i∈N , g, {ki}i∈N ,
{fi}i∈N). Then event A ∈ M is self-evident at state of the world w ∈ Ω,
if for each player i, A ∈ Mi, that is, if A ∈ ∧i∈NMi, and w ∈ A, where
∧i∈NMi is the finest κ-field which is included by all κ-fields Mi.
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Obviously, a self-evident event is a fixpoint of the players’ knowledge
operators. The following lemma is also apparent:
Lemma 21. If event A is self-evident at a state of the world, then it is
commonly known at the state of the world.
It is clear that the contrary of the above statement does not hold, in
the examples of Section 2 the event [0, 1) is commonly known, but not self-
evident.
The difference between the two notions is that if at a state of the world
an event is self-evident, then this is not only commonly known, but it is an
event that the event is commonly known, and it is commonly known that the
event is commonly known and so on at any level independently from κ.
In the following we revisit Aumann (1976)’s and Aumann and Branden-
burger (1995)’s results.
Theorem 22. Consider knowledge-belief space (S, {(T,Mi)}i∈N , g, {ki}i∈N ,
{fi}i∈N) with common prior P , and event A ∈ M. Then, if at state of
the world w ∈ Ω, there exist pi ∈ [0, 1] and event B ∈ M such that B ⊆⋂
i∈N{w ∈ Ω: fi(w)(A) = pi}, B is self-evident, and P (B) > 0, then pi = pj,
i, j ∈ N .
Proof. From the definition of self-evidence (Definition 20), B ∈ ∧i∈NMi.
Therefore, for each player i ∈ N :
P (A ∩B) =
∫
B
fi(·)(A) dP = piP (B) .
Since P (B) 6= 0, pi = pj, i, j ∈ N . 
The proof above is the same as Aumann (1976)’s. Therefore, the distinc-
tion between common knowledge and self-evidence is relevant.
Next we consider Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)’s result (THEO-
REM B, p. 1168).
Theorem 23. Consider a game in strategic form Γ = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N)
and knowledge-belief space (S, {(T,Mi)}i∈N , g, {ki}i∈N , {fi}i∈N) with com-
mon prior P . Moreover, let B,G,R ∈ M be such that B ⊆ ⋂i∈N{w ∈
ω : ψi(w) = ψ¯i}, where ψi : Ω → ∆(S−i) is Mi-measurable, player i’s con-
juncture on the other players’ strategies, ψ¯i ∈ ∆(S−i), G is the event of that
the players play game Γ, and R ⊆ ⋂i∈N Ri, where Ri is the event of that
player i is rational, i ∈ N .
Furthermore, let event A ∈M be such that
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1. at each state of the world w ∈ A, each player knows event G,
2. at each state of the world w ∈ A, event B is self-evident,
3. at each state of the world w ∈ A, each player knows event R,
4. P (A) > 0.
Then, at each state of the world w ∈ A, for all players i, j, k ∈ N ,
(ψi(w))k = (ψj(w))k, where (ψi(w))k is player i’s conjecture about player k’s
strategy, and let σk = (ψi(w))k. Furthermore, ×i∈Nσi ∈ ∆(S) is a Nash
equilibrium in game Γ.
In other words, if the played game and the players’ rationality are mu-
tually known and the players’ conjectures are self-evident, then the players
play a Nash equilibrium in the game.
Proof. Notice that by the definition of self-evidence (Definition 20), B ∈
∧i∈NMi, and for all states of the world w,w′ ∈ B and player i ∈ N , ψi(ω′) =
ψi(ω
′′) = ψ¯i. Moreover, from Theorem 22 at each state of the world w ∈ B,
for all players i, j, k ∈ N : (ψi(w))k = (ψj(w))k = σk.
Then for all states of the world w ∈ A and players i, j ∈ N , let sj ∈ Sj
be such that Pi(ψ
−1
i ({sj} × S−i,j), w) > 0, where Pi(·, w) is player i’s belief
at state of the world w. Since Pi(B,w) = Pi(G,w) = Pi(R,w) = 1 and
Pi(ψ
−1
i ({sj} × S−i,j), w) > 0:
Pi
(
B
⋂
G
⋂
R
⋂
ψ−1i ({sj} × S−i,j), w
)
> 0 ,
hence
B
⋂
G
⋂
R
⋂
ψ−1i ({sj} × S−i,j) 6= ∅ .
Therefore, there exists state of the world w ∈ B ⋂G⋂R such that
ψi(w)({sj} × S−i,j) > 0, that is, sj is a best response to conjecture ψ¯j.
Finally, since for each player all actions with positive probability in a
conjecture is best response to conjecture ψ¯i, ×i∈Nσi is a Nash equilibrium in
strategic form game Γ. 
As in the case of Theorem 22, the proof of the theorem goes as Aumann
and Brandenburger (1995)’s proof goes. Therefore again the notion of self-
evidence is the one the above results call for.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we have uncovered a logical inconsistency in the epistemic mod-
els used in the literature. It is common that while a finitary language is used
for describing the belief hierarchies and common knowledge, an infinitary
one is used for giving the players’ beliefs (σ-additive measures) and informa-
tion structures (σ-fields). We have fixed this inconsistency and introduced
a model, where the universal knowledge-belief space exists, is complete, and
encompasses all belief hierarchies.
Moreover, we have presented examples demonstrating that in the fixed
(our) model two famous results of epistemic game theory, Aumann (1976)
and Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) do not hold. However, we showed
that by substituting self-evidence for common knowledge Aumann (1976)’s
and Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)’s results become true again, so these
results call for self-evidence rather than for common knowledge.
A Inverse systems, inverse limits
In this appendix we introduce the basic notions of inverse system and inverse
limit.
Definition 24. Let (I,≤) be a preordered set, (Xi)i∈I be a family of nonvoid
sets, and for all i, j ∈ I such that i ≤ j, fij : Xj → Xi. Then (Xi, (I,≤), fij)
is an inverse system if it meets the following:
• fii = idXi,
• fik = fij ◦ fjk,
i, j, k ∈ I such that i ≤ j and j ≤ k.
The inverse system, also called projective system, is a family of sets con-
nected by functions.
Definition 25. Let ((Xi,Ai, µi), (I,≤), fij) be an inverse system such that
for all i ∈ I, (Xi,Ai, µi) is a κ-measure space. The inverse system ((Xi,Ai,
µi), (I,≤), fij) is an inverse system of κ-measure spaces if it meets the fol-
lowing:
• fij is an Aj-measurable function,
• µi = µj ◦ f−1ij ,
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i, j ∈ I such that i ≤ j.
Next we introduce the notion of inverse limit.
Definition 26. Let (Xi, (I,≤), fij) be an inverse system, X = ×i∈IXi and
P = {x ∈ X : for all i, j such that i ≤ j, pri(x) = fij ◦ prj(x)}, where for
all i ∈ I, pri is the coordinate projection from X to Xi. Then P is called
the inverse limit of the inverse system (Xi, (I,≤), fij), and it is denoted by
lim←−(Xi, (I,≤), fij).
Moreover, let pi = pri|P , so for all i, j ∈ I such that i ≤ j, pi = fij ◦ pj.
Projection pi is called canonical projection, i ∈ I.
In other words, the inverse limit is a generalization of the Cartesian prod-
uct. If (I,≤) is such that every element of I is related only to itself, that
is, for all i, j ∈ I, (i ≤ j) ⇒ (i = j), then the inverse limit is the Cartesian
product.
Definition 27. Let ((Xi,Ai, µi), (I,≤), fij) be an inverse system of κ-meas-
ure spaces and P = lim←−(Xi, (I,≤), fij). Then the κ-measure space (P,A, µ) is
the inverse limit of the inverse system of κ-measure spaces ((Xi,Ai, µi), (I,≤
), fij) denoted by (P,A, µ) = lim←−((Xi,Ai, µi), (I,≤), fij), if it meets the fol-
lowing:
1. A is the coarsest κ-field for which the canonical projections pi are A-
measurable, i ∈ I,
2. µ is a κ-measure such that µ ◦ p−1i = µi, i ∈ I.
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